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Abstract: This paper examines a marriage market with externality.
We ﬁrst develop an appropriate notion of stability for this market, called E-
stability. We provide an example to show that an E-stable outcome need not
exist. We then derive conditions under which an E-stable outcome exists.
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In this paper we consider marriage markets with externalities.
Marriage models are an important subclass of two-sided matching models
with one-to-one matchings. There are two disjoint class of agents, say men
and women. An agent on one side of the market can be matched to another
agent from the other side of the market, or he/she may remain single. In a
classic paper, Gale and Shapley (1962) develop the standard solution concept
for marriage markets, that of stability. An outcome is said to be stable if it
cannot be blocked by individual or pairwise coalitions. They also establish
that a stable outcome exists.
We generalize the standard marriage market model to allow for exter-
nalities, something that we believe are important in reality. Such external-
ities are likely to be exist whenever the agents, after the completion of the
matching process, indulge in some activity where the outcome depends on
the earlier assignment.
As an example, consider a labor market where every ﬁrm employs ex-
actly one worker and the wage rate is exogenously given. In such a market
the proﬁt of a ﬁrm may depend on which worker is hired by a rival ﬁrm,
or whether rival ﬁrms manage to ﬁll their vacancies at all. Alternatively,
consider a game of technology transfer from technologically advanced for-
eign ﬁrms to domestic ﬁrms. Interpreting the process of technology transfer
as a matching process, the proﬁts of the ﬁrms in the post-transfer game is
clearly going to depend on the earlier matching, i.e. which domestic ﬁrm
bought which technology etc. In fact, even in real marriage markets one can
observe examples of externalities e.g. jealousy etc.
There is some work dealing with externalities in the context of assign-
ment models, i.e. marriage markets with money. These include, among
1others, Li (1993), Roy Chowdhury (1997) and Sonmez (1996).
To the best of our knowledge, the only other work on marriage markets
with externalities is by Sasaki and Toda (1996). They consider a notion of
stability where the agents are assumed to be very pessimistic. Existence is
shown, as well as the fact that this notion of stability does not contradict
Pareto optimality.
In this paper we consider an alternative notion of stability called E-
stability, where agents are assumed to be not so pessimistic. Under this
notion any coalition, either singleton or pairwise, block a matching if, by
deviating, they are made better oﬀ under both the existing assignment,
as well as the post-deviation assignment. We can think of this notion as
an application of Cournot-Nash conjectures in that the deviating agents
assume that the other, non-deviating, agents are not going to deviate from
the proposed assignment. This is in contrast to Sasaki and Toda (1996)
where a coalition blocks a matching if the coalition is made better oﬀ under
all possible assignments.
Compared to the Sasaki-Toda (1996) deﬁnition, under our notion of
stability deviations are more likely, and hence the existence of a ‘stable’
outcome is not guaranteed. In fact we provide an example to demonstrate
that an E-stable outcome need not exist. We then derive suﬃcient conditions
for the existence of an E-stable outcome.
2 The Model
We ﬁrst develop the basic model without externalities and then go on to
model the case with externalities.
22.1 No Externalities
There are two disjoint set of agents, denoted M and W, where M is the set
of men and W is the set of women. Members of M are called the m−agents,
and members of W are called the w−agents.
The preference of every man m is represented by an ordered list of pref-
erences, P(m), on the set W ∪{m}. Similarly, the preference of every woman
w is represented by an ordered list of preferences, P(w), on the set M ∪{w}.
We assume that preferences are complete and transitive.
Let P denote the set of preferences for all agents in M and W. The
triple {M,W,P} denotes a marriage market. We write w >m w0 when m
strictly prefers w to w0, and w ≥m w0 when m weakly prefers w to w0. One
can deﬁne m >w m0 and m ≥w m0 similarly.
We now introduce a series of deﬁnitions that we require for the analysis.
Deﬁnition. An assignment µ is an one-to-one correspondence from the
set M ∪W onto itself of order two such that if, for some m ∈ M, µ(m) 6= m,
then µ(m) ∈ W and if, for some w ∈ W, µ(w) 6= w, then µ(w) ∈ M.
Let µx denote an assignment where all matchings follow µ, except that
agent x and agent µ(x) (in case µ(x) 6= x) remain single.
Let µmw denote an assignment where all matchings follow µ, except that
m and w are matched to each other. Moreover, if µ(m) 6= m then µ(m)
remains single under µmw, and if µ(w) 6= w then µ(w) remains single under
µmw.
We are now in a position to deﬁne the notion of stability.
Deﬁnition. A matching µ is stable if
(i) there exists no x such that x strictly prefers {x} to µ(x), and
(ii) there exists no m and w such that, m strictly prefers w to µ(m), and
3w strictly prefers m to µ(w).
For a marriage market without externality we have the following well
known result by Gale and Shapley (1962).
Theorem 1. For every marriage market {M,W,P}, a stable matching
exists.
We refer the readers to Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a succinct dis-
cussion of the literature on marriage markets.
2.2 Introducing Externalities
We then examine the case where the preferences of the agents are a function
of the assignment itself. Consider the following example.
Example 1. Let M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1,w2}. Let the preferences
of the agents be as follows.
(i) In case w2 is single, m1’s preference is: w1 >m1 {m1} >m1 w2, and
w1’s preference is: m1 >w1 {w1} >w1 m2.
(ii) In case w2 is matched, m1’s preference is: {m1} >m1 w1 >m1 w2,
and w1’s preference is: {w1} >w1 m1 >w1 m2.
(iii) In case w1 is single, m2’s preference is: {m2} >m2 w2 >m2 w1, and
w2’s preference is: {w2} >w2 m2 >w2 m1.
(iv) In case w1 is matched, m2’s preference is: w2 >m2 {m2} >m2 w1,
and w2’s preference is: m2 >w2 {w2} >w2 m1.
Let P(m,µ) denote the preference of m when the actual assignment is
µ and let P(w,µ) denote the preference of w when the actual assignment is
µ. As Example 1 demonstrates, it is possible that for two diﬀerent µ and
µ0, P(m,µ) 6= P(m,µ0) and P(w,µ) 6= P(w,µ0).
4We then formally deﬁne the notion of stability in this case, called E-
stability. The deﬁnition of E-stability tries to capture the idea that for any
individual or a group to deviate from an assignment µ, a minimal condition
should be that the concerned deviation should be attractive under both µ, as
well as the post-deviation assignment. Thus E-stability satisﬁes a minimal
no-regret property so that post-deviation, no deviating coalition regrets the
decision to deviate.
Deﬁnition. A matching µ is E-stable if and only if
(i) there exists no x such that x strictly prefers {x} to µ(x) under both
P(x,µ) and P(x,µx), and
(ii) there exists no m and w such that m strictly prefers w to µ(m) under
both P(m,µ) and P(m,µmw), and w strictly prefers m to µ(w) under both
P(w,µ) and P(w,µmw).
Clearly, in the absence of externalities, this deﬁnition reduces to the Gale
and Shapley (1962) deﬁnition of stability.
3 Results
We ﬁrst use Example 1 to show that in the presence of externalities an
E-stable outcome need not exist.
Non-existence of E-stable outcomes. Consider Example 1. To begin
with note that for m1, being single is always strictly preferred to being
matched to w2. Hence there cannot be an E-stable outcome where m1 is
matched to w2. Similarly, there cannot be an E-stable outcome where m2 is
matched to w1. We then rule out the other possible candidate assignments
one by one.
5Case A. Consider µ such that all agents are single. Clearly, m1 and w1
prefer to be matched to each other under both µ and µm1w1.
Case B. Consider µ such that m1 is matched to w1 and m2 is matched
to w2. Clearly, m1 would prefer to remain single under both µ and µm1.
Case C. Consider µ such that m1 is matched to w1 and the other agents
are single. Clearly, m2 and w2 would prefer to be matched to each other
under both µ and µm2w2.
Case D. Consider µ such that m2 is matched to w2 and the other agents
are single. Clearly, m2 would prefer to be single under both µ and µm2.
The existence result in Gale and Shapley (1962) depends on the two-
sidedness of the market, as well as the fact that matchings are one-to-one.
For example, Gale and Shapley (1962) use the roommate problem to demon-
strate that non-existence may occur if the market is not two-sided. Alkan
(1986) use an example involving three-sided matching to make a similar
point. Roth and Sotomayor (1990), on the other hand, use a many-to-one
matching model to underline the crucial importance of the assumption that
the matching process is one-to-one (see Example 2.7, pp. 25-26). Example
1 demonstrates that another critical assumption behind the Gale-Shapley
result is the absence of externalities.
We then turn to the task of identifying conditions that ensure the exis-
tence of an E-stable outcome.
Consider Example 1. Note that with a change in the assignment, the
ranking of the agents vis-a-vis the agents on the other side of the market are
not changing, what is changing is the relative ranking between remaining
single and the agents on the other side of the market. Assumption 1 seeks
to rule out irregularities of such kind. In assignment models, for example,
similar assumptions are quite standard (see Shapley and Shubik (1972)).
6Assumption 1. For all agents and for all possible assignments, remain-
ing unmatched is the least preferred outcome.
Assumption 2 below imposes some additional regularity conditions on the
structure of externalities. Consider, for example, the labor market discussed
in the introduction. Clearly, if the ﬁrms and the workers are symmetric, then
Assumption 2 holds.
Assumption 2. Let µ and µ0 be two matchings such that the number
of matchings under both equal min{|M|,|W|}. Then P(m,µ) = P(m,µ0)
for all m and P(w,µ) = P(w,µ0) for all w.
We are now in a position to write down the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then an E-stable
outcome exists.
Proof. Let A = min{|M|,|W|}. From Assumption 2, P(m,µ) = ˜ P(m)
and P(w,µ) = ˜ P(w), for all µ involving A matchings. Now consider a
standard matching model without externalities where the preference of an
m-agent is given by ˜ P(m) and that of a w-agent by ˜ P(w). From Theorem
1, {M,W, ˜ P} has a stable assignment, say ˜ µ. Given Assumption 1, ˜ µ must
involve min{|M|,|W|} matchings.
We then check if the matching is E-stable. Given Assumption 1, none of
the agents who are matched under ˜ µ would prefer to be single rather than
remain matched. Next consider the possibility of pairwise deviations. Since
˜ µ is stable (in the Gale-Shapley sense) for {M,W, ˜ P}, there exists no pair m
and w such that m strictly prefers w to µ(m) under P(m, ˜ µ) and w strictly
prefers m to µ(w) under P(w, ˜ µ).
7Corollary. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an assignment is an E-stable
outcome if and only if it is a stable outcome, in the Gale-Shapley sense, of
the market {M,W, ˜ P}.
Proof. Clearly, given Assumption 1, any E-stable outcome must involve
min{|M|,|W|} matchings. Hence, any outcome is E-stable if and only if it
is a stable outcome of {M,W, ˜ P}.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines a marriage market with externalities. We ﬁrst provide
an example to show that in the presence of externalities, a ‘stable’ (i.e. E-
stable) outcome need not exist. We then identify conditions under which
an E-stable outcome exists. Inter alia, we also relate the E-stable outcomes
of this model to the stable outcomes of a related standard marriage market
(without externalities).
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